Hello from Baghdad. My tour is rapidly coming to a close. It is unbelievable how quickly it is passing. Currently, my deployment is 70% complete. This has been an incredible experience. For those who read this blog entry for its non-DoD acquisition content, I’m sorry. I’ve promised Dr. Curtin that I would give him my perspective on lessons learned relative to rapidly fielding equipment to meet emergent war fighter needs, and that will be my focus for this blog entry. I’ve supported USN operators with respect to DoD acquisition for the past 25 years. I’ve been a member of teams that have introduced equipment to the operator through streamlined acquisition process (i.e. between 12 – 24 months), testing to procure initiatives through OSD (i.e. less than 18 months) and more traditional acquisition initiatives (i.e. over 24 months). Through my experience of the past three months, I have been exposed to a rapidly evolving threat, an extreme operating environment and very innovative operators.
Of course, the evolving and lethal threat accelerates the need to get something out there. When we see US, coalition and friendly host nation “Wounded In Actions” and “Killed In Actions” day after day, all understand the urgency for rapidly getting hardware to the field. One of the themes that consistently receives attention, here in-theater, is using the baseline capability as the means for determining and measuring projected operational value of any proposed solution for the operational need. This is a key enabler that can place equipment into the operators’ hands sooner rather than later. If a program languishes within the bureaucracy, it often times will lose credibility because the fight moves on. Either through the continual flow of new equipment to the theater or through evolving Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TT&P), the value of the proposed solution can be minimized or eliminated. Unlike acquisition and technology initiatives in the “rear”, i.e. CONUS-based support laboratories and commands, a high priority operational need WILL be addressed in some manner. This will occur quickly in-theater, either through employment of COTS systems, a change in TT&P or a diminished threat due to a change in operational conditions. The time from official notification of program initiation to equipment fielding is targeted for less than 12 months. If much more than 12 months transpires, the battlefield could likely take a different form and a different set of rules could apply thereby rendering the resulting equipment of little value.
Taking this general rule into account, and assuming a well-defined operational need has been articulated, the next step is to get prototypes into operators’ hands. Identifying which COTS-based solutions offer the most promise takes an experienced acquisition agent who specializes in that specific war fighting area. This agent will normally be a government laboratory, contractor or acquisition office. The main areas of focus for this COTS selection, other than the “mission specific” Measures of Effectiveness critical to get the job done, (i.e. probabilities of detection, probabilities of false alarm, etc.) are system reliability and availability. Vendors advertised metrics must be validated by independent sources. The suitability of the tool to be used or employed by a war fighter that already has a growing toolbox must be well understood. Thus, equipment that requires unique knowledge, skills and abilities will not be viewed as positives. Training that can teach the critical skills necessary to operate the machine in a short period of time is vital. Also, the ability to repair the subject machine when it breaks is another key attribute that will lead to an effective and efficient assessment of the COTS solution. Weeding out COTS solutions often times requires someone to employ the machine in an operationally reflective scenario. To do this a cadre of operators’ representatives needs to provide a quick assessment of the machine relative to system suitability issues and develop notional Concepts of Operations or the like.
I’ve also had the benefit of working in theater over these past three months with leaders who are here on their second deployment. Selected key individuals were here in late 2003 through 2004. COL. Lutz, who was the first Commander of Task Force Troy in 2005, is back at TF Troy for a second tour. After speaking to these veterans of the C-IED war, it has become more obvious to me that urgent needs today require equipment that has suitability especially in the area of reliability that has been characterized and validated. Today, with the C-IED toolbox being filled with more tools than in 2005, the demands on prototypes to meet validated urgent needs are more stringent than in 2005.
The specific take-aways from my experience here that affect the most change in the fastest timeline possible are:
A) Specific definition of the operational need that has stakeholder consensus;
B) Mature prototype (i.e. well characterized) that is reliable and can be used to generate 1st generation TT&P;
C) A Operational Assessment that focuses on effectiveness and suitability (i.e. reliability, logistic support including training & maintenance, etc.);
D) Follow-on procurement of required inventory of equipment
Prioritization of the operational need considering baseline capability and existing operational risk will define the trade space of “speed to field” versus robustness of capability (i.e. effectiveness and suitability). There are numerous ACAT models that employ the characteristics of the above dialogue, specifically Immediate War fighter Need/Joint Urgent Operational Need, Defense Acquisition Challenge Program, Abbreviated Acquisition Initiatives (DoDINST 5000.2).
I guess I’ll sign off. But before I do, I wanted to highlight the details of another fallen hero who died in support of our country and OIF. Please remember, routinely, just like we all see in the daily editions of USA Today, our soldiers are paying the ultimate price for the freedom we enjoy in our everyday life. So in every effort, those engaged in moving technology from the laboratory to the war fighter need to feel a sense of urgency and a sense of personal purpose. Petty Officer 2nd Class Kevin R. Bewley was from the little town of Hector, Ark. — but he was among the thousands of enlisted Navy personnel who for a year or two make Whidbey Island their home. Petty Officer Bewley, 27, died while performing one of the more dangerous duties in Iraq. He was part of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, and he died of wounds suffered when a bomb detonated while he was conducting operations in Salah ad Din province, said the Navy.
Petty Officer Bewley was a member of EOD Mobile Unit 11, based at the Naval Air Station at Whidbey Island. His father, Ron Bewley, of Hector, said, “Let me tell you, man, it’s hard to bury your boy when he gets killed in Iraq. … My son’s name is Kevin Ronald Bewley. He was born April 18, 1980. He was born at St. Mary’s Hospital in Russellville, Ark. He weighed 7 pounds, 6 ounces. I’m his daddy.”
Petty Officer Bewley was part of a tight-knit group of EOD members. It’s very much a brotherhood in his unit. The brothers loved to travel together; they made a driving trek to the Arctic Circle. They lived their lives with no regrets. After first joining the National Guard, Petty Officer Bewley joined the Navy in November 2001. He already had served a deployment in Iraq in 2006. “He literally had disarmed hundreds of bombs. Each one he disarmed saved someone’s life”.
