Unmanned Systems In Iraq

March 13, 2008

Fighting IEDs

Filed under: Uncategorized — auvsi @ 11:38 am

Hope all is well in Shirlington, the weather is fairly agreeable here. The temperatures have been hovering around 80F to 90 F during the day and around 60F at night. The only negative is the occasional sand storm that occurs when the winds kick up around 30 knots or more. The visibility is then reduced to anywhere from 3-5 yards to 100 yards. As you probably read on Monday, we lost eight U.S. servicemen on Monday to IED events. Five lost their lives in one event in a market in downtown Baghdad when a man wearing a suicide bomber with an IED vest detonated himself in the mist of a group of servicemen. This is the type of event that is very sobering to hear about but it does drive home the importance of rapidly getting technology to the warfighter to minimize risk to personnel and to decrease the tactical timeline of accomplishing any given mission as assigned. I want to in this brief synopsis, explain the process used “forward,” i.e. in-theater, to address emerging operational needs.

I need to put this description in context. I’m describing a process that I have been exposed to for about 20 days. I’m still learning and will be able to give better insight into the specifics as I gain additional experience and exposure over the course of the next 100 days. However, because I am relatively naïve and unbiased to the methodology and pedigree, you will get a very upfront and honest interpretation. I also will refer to lists of activities that perform specifics functions, I want to emphasize that when I list organizations, please treat them as examples of appropriate candidates, not that the listing is comprehensive in nature. For clarification, this is my understanding of the “Road to Documenting a Requirement,” i.e. the sequence of steps typically followed to field equipment to meet a mission need.

Initially, the issue and/or capability gap is highlighted by an operator and/or someone in the chain of command. This could be from a platoon leader, company commander or other. I will give you an example of a notional operational need I’m referring to, such as the capability gap ranging from detecting or classifying objects of interest to assessing ways of improving logistic supportability of equipment or operational components. Such a need is verified through the conduct of basic research; this is conducted by the group I work for, TF Troy (J8). We will determine if this issue and/or capability gap has been addressed in the past. We will do this through cold calls to in-theater support agents such as the U.S. Army’s “Rapid Equipping Force” (i.e. the REF), the Army Test and Evaluation Command or some other comparable command. Obviously, one of the first organizations contacted is the Joint IED Defeat Organization. They are the focus of all DoD efforts to address the IED problem in support of OIF and OEF. Because the nature of the Counter-IED effort in-theater is more U.S. Army-centric, typically this level of investigative work is completed with a focus on Army-based commands.

Also at this time, commands in the “rear,” such as the Army Research Lab, Research, Development Evaluation Command (RDECOM), Naval EOD Technology Division, U.S. Marine Corp Systems Command, etc. This list is not intended to be comprehensive but is intended to show the extensive list of players in the C-IED arena.

If it appears that this issue and/or capability gap is real, then within CJTF Troy (J8) we conduct additional independent investigating through such tools as Internet surveys, contacting Applied Research and Physics laboratories and reviewing past internal CJTF Troy (J8) documents, briefs and general correspondence. At this time, we also can conduct additional interviews with past Battalion and/or Company commanders including Platoon leaders. This is one of the distinct advantages of being in theater. You have immediate access to a wide spectrum of operators. If subject issue and/or capability gap has a resolution that has been proven, we communicate that back to originator. If a resolution has not been identified then we will proceed to next step. If warranted, a basic form entitled the Technology Interest Assessment (TIA) is used to solicit operator opinion and gain consensus to verify that a capability gap/problem exists. This form or data collection mechanism is used to glean operator input from the Division level in the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). The TIA evolves as each Division’s input is received and ultimately consensus is achieved. If consensus can not be achieved or there is a consensus that the issue or capability gap does not warrant further effort, then we will terminate all efforts and communicate results back to the originating entity.

Additional investigation being conducted and TIA feedback is garnered to populate a Programmatic “Quad” chart which outlines the problem, a notional approach and system description, projected timeline and cost data. This subject “Quad” is used to socialize and gain chain of command consensus of the notional approach to addressing the capability gap-scope of effort projected to meet need. The “Quad” evolves, becomes mature and ultimately consensus is achieved. Again consensus can be achieved by visiting the leadership here in theater, i.e. Multi-National Force-Iraq, JIEDDO, and ultimately USCENTCOM. This survey of leadership, within the confines of the ITO, aides in rapidly developing and achieving leadership “buy-in.” However, even forward, my colleagues proclaim, this consensus building within the ranks of leadership can be time consuming and tedious at best.

Ultimately, one or two primary avenues are pursued; a Joint Urgent Operational Needs document is drafted with a goal per CJCSI 3470.01 of 15 July 2007, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs of fielding hardware within 41 days from when the combatant commander makes their formal submit. Or the initial requirement can be meet through the JIEDDO where limited initial outfitting quantities of equipment can be procured and maintained. This accelerates the process but is very limited in scope.

Through the JUONS and/or the JIEDDO project funding process a in-theater or surrogate Operational Assessment is conducted to insure potential for operational effectiveness and suitability is quantitatively and qualitatively evaluated. The exit criteria for such assessments are usually agreed upon between the TF Troy (J8) and a fleet representative component such as ATEC, NAV EOD Fleet Liaison Office or some other similar type of office.  

Basically, the accelerated timeline is made possible by many aspects of the Accelerated Acquisition process such as a widely accepted capability gap, a focused war fighting group to evaluate prototypical systems and develop 1st generation requirements and notional Concepts of Operations (i.e. the TIA process and operator input), a leadership champion(s) and a focused Test and Evaluation effort that assesses potential for operational suitability and effectiveness against a well understood baseline.

Hope this helps. I will try to tweak my synopsis as I continue my assignment over the next 100 days, highlighting areas where I got it wrong and emphasizing areas that I can validate. As I sign off, I will highlight another Operation Iraqi Freedom hero who would give the ultimate price. On August 9, 2007, Marine Sgt. Michael E. Tayaotao, 27, of Sunnyvale, Calif., assigned to 7th Engineer Support Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, Calif., died from wounds sustained while conducting combat operations in Anbar province, Iraq.
 
Sgt. Michael E. Tayaotao, 27, joined the Marines soon after he graduated from Fremont High School in Sunnyvale. He volunteered to return to Iraq for his third tour seven months ago and had hoped to return to resume his education and go fishing with friends. “He’s a great man, that’s all I can say,” said Tayaotao’s uncle, Felix Tayaotao, 45, of Sunnyvale. “He’s a straightforward and brave man. He did what he can for his country, for his people.”

Michael Tayaotao enjoyed shooting guns, camping and fishing, his uncle said. He joined the Marines within months of graduating from Fremont High, believing that it would be a profession, said his uncle, with whom he often stayed in Sunnyvale.

No Comments Yet »

No comments yet.

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URI

Leave a comment

Blog at WordPress.com.